From Deterrence to Disequilibrium: Rethinking Nuclear Proliferation in a Multipolar World

Abstract

This article theorizes the transformation of nuclear deterrence under conditions of emerging multipolarity, arguing that the contemporary nuclear order is increasingly characterized by strategic disequilibrium rather than stable deterrence equilibrium. Classical deterrence theory, predicated on bipolarity, rational actor assumptions, and relatively stable escalation ladders, inadequately accounts for the proliferation incentives and crisis instability generated by today’s fragmented strategic environment. The study contends that multipolar nuclear politics are shaped by asymmetric force modernization, selective and contested norm enforcement within the non-proliferation regime, and the entanglement of nuclear dynamics with dual-use technological domains, including cyber and space systems. Methodologically, the article employs a qualitative comparative design combining process tracing and thematic analysis across three analytically diverse cases: South Asia (India–Pakistan dyad), the Korean Peninsula (North Korea’s nuclear consolidation), and great-power triangularity (United States–China–Russia strategic relations). Empirical material is drawn from official policy documents, IAEA and NPT regime archives, elite interviews, and authoritative policy and think-tank assessments. The analysis identifies three interlocking mechanisms assurance deficits, normative asymmetry, and technological diffusion—that systematically mediate the shift from deterrence stability to disequilibrium. The article advances a mid-range theoretical framework integrating neorealist structural logics with constructivist insights on norm contestation, offering a refined conceptualization of deterrence dynamics under multipolarity. It concludes that strategic disequilibrium is not episodic but structurally embedded in the evolving nuclear order, with significant implications for regime legitimacy and crisis stability.